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LAU, CHIU, AND HONGKNOWLEDGE ESTIMATION AND MESSAGE CONSTRUCTION
I KNOW WHAT YOU KNOW: ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT OTHERS’ KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON MESSAGE CONSTRUCTION
Ivy Yee-Man Lau and Chi-yue Chiu
University of Hong Kong
Ying-yi Hong
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Current models of interpersonal communication assume that estimation of lis-
tener’s knowledge is a basis for message formulation. By introducing methodologi-
cal modifications to the Fussell and Krauss (1992) paradigm, the present study
provided more definitive evidence for the use of knowledge estimation in message
productions. In the first experiment, participants indicated whether they knew each
of 30 landmarks (thus providing the actual distribution of knowledge) and esti-
mated the proportion of students who would know them. Participants’ estimation
of the relative distribution of knowledge corresponded impressively with the actual
distribution. In the second experiment, a different group of participants described
each of the landmarks to an intended audience. The length of the descriptions and
the frequency of naming a landmark were predicted by the estimated identifiability
from Experiment 1. These results replicated previous findings in a different culture
and addressed unresolved issues related to the role of knowledge estimation in
communication.
Communicative success requires coordination between communicative
partners (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Fussell & Krauss, 1992; Isaacs &
Clark, 1987; Krauss & Fussell, 1991; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). Some
types of coordination are directly observable, such as turn-taking; others
are not directly observable, such as cognitively formulating what to in-
clude in each speaking turn. Message formulation is affected by the
amount of knowledge shared between the speaker and the listener. Re-
Social Cognition, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2001, pp. 587-600
587
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by a research grant awarded by the Re-
search Grants Council, HKSAR (HKU/7130/97H).
Correspondence concerning this paper should be sent to Ivy Y. M. Lau, Department of
Psychology, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong. E-mail:
ilau@hkusua.hku.hk, cychiu@hkusua.hku.hk, or sohong@ust.hk.
searchers have examined at length the process of developing common
information in the course of conversation (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Krauss & Glucksberg, 1977; Krauss &
Weinheimer, 1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992), and a common ground
of knowledge has been found to be essential for successful communica-
tion (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Fussell & Krauss, 1991, 1992; Isaacs &
Clark, 1987; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Schober, 1998).
A logical first step in establishing a common ground is to estimate
what one’s communicative partner may or may not know. A few studies
investigating the influence of knowledge estimation on message formu-
lation (Fussell & Krauss, 1991, 1992; Krauss & Fussell, 1991) have clearly
shown that speakers estimate the knowledge they share with their com-
municative partners concerning the topic area so as to tailor an appropri-
ate message. However, these studies have also left a number of
theoretical and empirical questions unanswered. In particular, the rela-
tion between assumptions about others’ knowledge and message con-
struction has been weak. Although a number of explanations have been
put forward (see Fussell & Krauss, 1992), few studies have investigated
how beliefs about others’ knowledge might affect what information
would be included in a message. The study reported in the present paper
sought to examine these issues.
KNOWLEDGE ESTIMATION AND MESSAGE PRODUCTION
The importance of assumptions regarding one’s communicative part-
ner’s informational background can be seen most clearly in referential
communication, in which a speaker has to formulate one or a series of
messages to permit a listener to identify a referent. In several referential
communication experiments, Fussell and Krauss (1992) assessed the in-
fluence of knowledge estimation on message formulation. In Experi-
ment 1, Columbia University undergraduates viewed pictures of 15 U.S.
public figures (e.g., Woody Allen, George Bush). For each target, they
rated how identifiable it was, estimated the actual proportion of Colum-
bia University undergraduates who could name it, and indicated the tar-
get’s name if they knew it. Correct identifications of the 15 targets
ranged form 0% to 93%, and were highly correlated with the mean esti-
mates of the identifiability made by the group for each target (r = .95).
Thus participants were accurate in estimating their peers’ knowledge of
the public figures. Moreover, their accuracy was not determined by their
own knowledge of the target. Both participants who could correctly
name and those who could not name the target gave relatively accurate
estimates of the percentage of people who would know the target (rs =
.82 for the named estimates and .70 for the unnamed estimates). The
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same pattern of results was found in experiments using everyday ob-
jects (e.g., kitchen utensils, tools) as the experimental stimuli (Experi-
ments 3 and 4). Furthermore, there was evidence that participants’
estimation of proportion of people who could identify a target figure or
recognize a target object influenced their message formulation. In an-
other experiment (Experiment 2), pairs of Columbia University under-
graduates performed a referential communication task. One participant
(the director) in each pair described each of the 15 previously used pub-
lic figures so that the other participant (the matcher) could select the pic-
ture from the full array of 15.
The directors’ referential messages in their first speaking turn (i.e.,
messages constructed before receiving any feedback from the matchers)
were analyzed. If the directors took estimated knowledge of the match-
ers into consideration, it should exert the most influence on these mes-
sages. For each target figure, the mean message length (number of
words averaged across participants) was negatively related to the mean
estimated identifiability of the target (Experiment 1). Participants in-
cluded more information in the referential message when the target’s es-
timated identifiability was low, and vice versa. This finding was
replicated in a subsequent experiment (Experiment 4) using everyday
objects as stimuli. Taken collectively, the findings from this series of ex-
periments indicated that estimation of social distribution of knowledge
is related to message formulation.
ISSUES ARISING FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES
The Fussell and Krauss (1992) experiments, however, also raised a num-
ber of interesting issues. First, although the correlation between stimu-
lus identifiability and the length of the first turn message was significant
(r = -.28), it was weak. There are several possible reasons for the low cor-
relation. First, the identifiability of some stimuli may not be stable. For
example, how widely known a particular public figure was might have
changed between the time stimuli identifiability ratings were collected
and the time the referential communication experiment was conducted.
When the investigators used stimuli (everyday objects) that were less
likely to vary in recognizability over time, the correlation between stim-
ulus identifiability and message length increased to -.66.
Second, participants were not given the names of the stimuli, and only
messages in which the target stimulus was named correctly were in-
cluded in data analyses. The researchers noted, however, that compared
to named messages, unnamed messages were substantially longer, and
required more speaking turns to establish reference. By excluding the
unnamed messages, the investigators might have restricted the range of
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message length and hence underestimated the strength of association
between estimated stimulus identifiability and message length. More-
over, if the unnamed messages were longer than named ones, the target
stimuli in unnamed messages might have been less identifiable than
those in the named messages. The same conclusion can be deduced from
the premise that more widely known stimuli are more likely to be
named. Accordingly, the messages included in the analysis might have
contained fewer descriptions of low identifiability stimuli than descrip-
tions of high identifability stimuli. Group estimates of message length
might have been less reliable for descriptions of low identifiability stim-
uli than for descriptions of high identifiability stimuli, thus attenuating
the correlation between stimulus identifiability and message length.
Also, given the inclusion criteria, it is unclear whether the relationship
between assumptions of others’ knowledge and message construction
could be generalized to the unnamed messages.
Finally, the investigators found that communicators “frequently pro-
vided little or no identifying information with the name of a stimulus, re-
gardless of its recognizability” (p. 389). They suggested that two-way
communication is a demanding task, as the speaker needs to formulate
messages and monitor the addressee’s feedback simultaneously. A typi-
cal communicative sequence begins with a referring expression, fol-
lowed by feedback from the addressee, which can be used by the speaker
to repair the expression. Hence, the interactive nature of the experimen-
tal task might have diminished the cognitive resources that the director
needed in order to consider the addressee’s perspective. Consequently,
the director might have shifted the basis for message formulation from
prior assumptions of the addressee’s knowledge to feedback from the
addressee.
However, even in an interactive communication task, communicators
are expected to minimize collaborative effort in establishing reference
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Furthermore, previous studies have
shown that directors have no difficulty in taking the addressee’s per-
spective even in an interactive communication task (Krauss, 1987). Thus,
it is hard to understand why the director would in the first speaking turn
shift all the responsibility to the addressee by mentioning only the name
of the referent. A more reasonable strategy would be to make approxi-
mate estimates of the addressee’s knowledge and rely on such rough es-
timates to construct a “comprehensible” message, which would be
further refined based on the addressee’s feedback.
To understand why many messages contained the name of the refer-
ent only, recall that Fussell and Krauss included in their analysis only
those messages in which the director mentioned the name of the refer-
ent. Further, participants’ estimates were biased in the direction of their
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own knowledge. Fussell and Krauss (1992, Experiments 1, 3, and 4)
found that estimates of the proportion of people who would know a par-
ticular referent were higher for participants who knew the name of the
referent than for participants who did not. If those participants who
knew the name of the referent believed that a considerable proportion of
people in the population also knew its name, then the name of the refer-
ent should be sufficient for correct identification. Therefore, it would be
reasonable for them to mention only the name in their description and
wait for feedback from the addressee to refine their message. Consistent
with these ideas, previous research has shown that people giving direc-
tions to others are more likely to use the proper name (Isaacs & Clark,
1987) when the target location is estimated to be known to most people.
According to this line of reasoning, even those participants who men-
tioned only the name of the referent had taken into account the ad-
dressee’s knowledge when they constructed their message. However,
their message might not have been comprehensible to the addressee be-
cause their estimates of the addressee’s knowledge were biased by their
own knowledge.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The study reported in this paper was an attempt to address these interpre-
tive issues. The experimental procedures were similar to those in the
Fussell and Krauss (1992) experiments, with the following exceptions.
First, the participants were undergraduate students in Hong Kong and
the target stimuli were landmarks from three cities (Hong Kong, Macau,
and New York). By employing participants from a different culture, the
generalizability of the relation between knowledge estimation and mes-
sage formulation could be assessed. We used landmarks as the target
stimuli because they were commonly used in referential communication
tasks (e.g., Fussell & Krauss, 1991; see Yule, 1997) and their identifiability
to the participants was relatively stable. Fussell and Krauss (1992) sug-
gested that the nature of prior belief about others’ knowledge should be
established independent of its effect on message formulation. Accord-
ingly, knowledge estimations and referential expressions were obtained
from separate groups of participants. In Experiment 1, participants esti-
mated others’ knowledge of specific landmarks and also identified the
landmarks themselves. Identification of landmarks provided a direct esti-
mation of the proportion of people who know the landmarks in question.
Participants in Experiment 2 formulated messages intended for another
undergraduate student in their university.
Second, participants were not given addressee feedback. When com-
municative partners are interacting face-to-face, efficient referential
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communication is achieved by minimizing the amount of collective ef-
fort it takes to arrive at a joint perspective of the referent (Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Thus, producing an ambiguous first referring ex-
pression to the listener could be an attempt to achieve the least collabora-
tive effort by shifting the responsibility of repairing the expression to the
listener. When addressee’s feedback is precluded, estimation of the lis-
tener’s knowledge assumes urgency. To enable correct identification,
one would have to be much more precise in gauging the knowledge
shared with the audience. Accordingly, the correlation between knowl-
edge estimation and message length should be much larger when ad-
dressee feedback is precluded. However, if the director does consider
the addressee’s knowledge even when direct interaction with the ad-
dressee is allowed, absence of addressee feedback should not increase
the size of the correlation.
Finally, participants were given the names of the referents and could
decide whether or not to include them in the referential messages. Both
named and unnamed messages were analyzed. For someone who knew
a landmark, its name should be one of the most useful pieces of identifi-
cation information. Therefore, if participants estimated that the audi-
ence would know the name of the landmark, they would need to
provide very little additional identifying information once they had
named it.
The above line of reasoning led to the following three hypotheses.
First, message length should be negatively related to stimulus
identifiability, i.e., participants would include less identifying informa-
tion when they believed that the stimulus was widely known than when
they believed otherwise. Second, target stimuli should be named in a
message more frequently when they were believed to be highly identifi-
able than when they were not. Third, the more frequently a particular
landmark was named, the shorter the messages for this landmark would
be.
If these three hypotheses were supported, it would suggest that partic-
ipants took the addressee’s perspective when they constructed a refer-
ential message. In addition, it would also suggest that participants
considered what information would be sufficient for establishing com-
mon reference with the addressee.
EXPERIMENT 1: KNOWLEDGE ESTIMATION
Previous studies have found that people are generally quite sensitive to
the actual distribution of knowledge of city landmarks (Fussell &
Krauss, 1991), public figures (Fussell & Krauss, 1992, Experiment 1), and
everyday objects (Fussell & Krauss, 1992, Experiment 3). However, peo-
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ple’s estimates of others’ knowledge are also influenced by what they
themselves know (Fussell & Krauss, 1991, 1992; Nickerson, Baddeley, &
Freeman, 1987). Therefore, it was expected that participants would be
sensitive to the actual relative distribution of knowledge of landmarks
across different cities, but there would also be a tendency for them to
give higher estimates to places they themselves could identify.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety-eight undergraduates (34 males and 64 females with an average
age of 21.55) at the University of Hong Kong participated as part of a
classroom exercise.
PROCEDURE
Thirty slides of landmarks from Hong Kong, Macau, and New York City
(ten from each locale) were shown to participants in a random order. The
landmarks were selected with the criterion that they would be within a
wide range of familiarity for Hong Kong people in general. Each land-
mark was shown, then removed for the first time for participants to indi-
cate on paper (a) whether they knew the place shown on the slide and (b)
the name of the place if they knew it. Then the slide reappeared for par-
ticipants to write down the percentage of classmates they thought
would know the place.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As shown in Table 1, correct identifications of the 30 landmarks ranged
from 0% to 96.0% (M = 27.02, SD = 33.36). Mean estimates of
identifiability ranged from 10.6% to 97.1% (M = 39.89, SD = 24.91).
Mean estimates of identifiability correlated highly with correct identi-
fications (r = .94, p < .001, compared to r = .95 in Fussell & Krauss, 1992,
Experiment 1). Impressive as the correlation was, however, partici-
pants might have based their estimation on whether they thought they
knew the place or not. That is, if they thought they knew the place (re-
gardless of accuracy), they gave a high estimation of knowledge, and if
they did not know the place, they gave a low estimation of knowledge.
If that was the case, then the correlation reflects a simple judgment of
similarity and not an awareness of distribution of knowledge amongst
their classmates. To investigate this possibility, estimated knowledge
KNOWLEDGE ESTIMATION AND MESSAGE CONSTRUCTION 593
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Lisboa Hotel Macau 88.0 87.4 89.9 82.5 58.0
Guia Lighthouse Macau 12.0 31.5 51.1 30.1 28.7
Government Palace Macau 18.7 37.1 58.6 43.2 28.5
Penha Church Macau 14.7 32.8 50.9 40.8 28.1
S. Francisco Garden Macau 1.3 22.3 NA 30.0 21.4
Ruins of St. Paul Macau 84.0 87.0 91.2 83.8 55.0
Po Chai Sin Yuen Macau 1.3 45.1 NA 56.9 38.0
P. N. Da Silva Hospital Macau 0 23.7 NA 30.9 22.7
Weather Observatory Macau 16.0 25.5 39.8 45.0 21.2
Sao Domingos Church Macau 0 20.7 NA 23.3 20.5
Tai O Tin Hau Temple Hong Kong 1.3 22.9 NA 37.3 19.1
Tai O Pier Hong Kong 41.3 44.5 56.6 52.7 28.5
Lantau Po Lin Monastery Hong Kong 45.3 49.2 65.6 40.3 33.2
Bird Street Hong Kong 53.3 43.4 54.6 NA 28.6
Tung Chung Fortress Hong Kong 13.3 30.6 43.0 40.7 26.6
Cheung Chau Hong Kong 1.3 39.4 NA 55.5 21.3
Stanley Main Street Hong Kong 93.3 88.5 88.8 NA 83.3
Repulse Bay Hong Kong 70.7 72.3 80.6 NA 52.0
Ocean Terminal Hong Kong 78.7 72.8 81.6 NA 36.7
Temple Street Hong Kong 0 25.5 NA 30.8 24.5
Statue of Liberty New York 96.0 97.1 97.3 93.0 NA
U. S. Grant Memorial New York 0 26.6 NA 50.0 22.5
United Nations New York 20.0 26.1 37.7 39.8 20.3
Washington Square New York 1.3 33.6 NA 64.8 20.0
Empire State Building New York 45.3 40.3 51.4 NA 31.9
Metropolitan Museum New York 5.3 18.9 23.3 25.7 17.6
Lincoln Center New York 1.3 12.5 NA 18.3 12.2
World Trade Center* New York 5.3 14.8 41.3 28.3 12.4
Natural History Museum New York 0 10.6 NA 10.0 10.6
Rockefeller Center New York 1.3 14.2 NA 14.7 14.1
Note. Group estimates were not available when 0 or only 1 observation fell into the named, incorrectly
named, or unnamed category. *This study was conducted prior to September 11, 2001.
was regressed on actual knowledge separately for observations in
which participants knew the name of the landmark (named; Column 5
in Table 1) and for those in which they did not (unnamed, Column 7 in
Table 1). We also regressed estimates for observations in which partici-
pants incorrectly identified the landmark (incorrectly named, Column
6 in Table 1), although the results from this analysis should be inter-
preted with caution because it was based on relatively few partici-
pants’ estimates. The regression coefficient for and correlation with
mean identifiability ratings for the three groups are as follows: b + SE =
.62 + .06, t(16) = 10.80, p < .001, r = .94 for correctly named observations;
b + SE = .57 + .09, t(23) = 9.96, p < .001, r = .78 for incorrectly named ob-
servations; and b + SE = .43 + .05, t(27) = 8.47, p < .001, r = .85 for the un-
named observations. Because the numbers of observations in the three
regression equations were not the same due to missing data, we com-
pared the 95% confidence intervals of the regression coefficients in the
equations and found that the slopes of the three regression lines did not
differ significantly from each other.
As in Fussell and Krauss (1992), the estimates of others’ knowledge
were biased in the direction of the participants’ own knowledge. The in-
tercept of regression for the named observations (a + SE = 33.57 + 3.16)
was significantly higher than that of the regression line for the unnamed
observations (a + SE = 18.23 + 2.01). Although participants were sensi-
tive to the social distribution of knowledge in the undergraduate stu-
dent population, estimates of identifiability were higher for participants
who knew the landmarks than for those who did not.
The intercept of the regression line and its standard error for the incor-
rectly named observations was 32.10 + 3.22, which was not reliably dif-
ferent from that for the named observations, but was significantly higher
than that for the unnamed observations. Taken together, the results sug-
gested that as long as the participants believed that they knew the name
of a particular landmark, regardless of whether or not their knowledge
was accurate, they tended to give higher estimates of identifiability than
did those who did not name the landmark.
In short, Experiment 1 replicated the basic findings reported by
Fussell and Krauss (1992), and did so in a different culture. Participants
were reasonably sensitive to what others knew, although their estimates
of others’ knowledge were also biased in the direction of their own
knowledge. Would people consider these estimates when they construct
a message for their communicative partners? Experiment 2 addressed
this question.
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EXPERIMENT 2: KNOWLEDGE ESTIMATION AND MESSAGE
FORMULATION
METHOD
Nineteen undergraduate students (9 females and 10 males, average age
= 20.32) from the University of Hong Kong volunteered to participant in
the present experiment. The participants described pictures of the 30
landmarks used in Experiment 1 in their mother tongue of Cantonese (a
Chinese dialect spoken in Hong Kong), one at a time, with the aim that
another student from the same campus could listen to their description
and pick out the target landmark from the set of 30 pictures. The name of
each landmark was written on the back of the picture and therefore par-
ticipants could always name the target if they chose to. Each participant
described the landmarks in a different random order. All descriptions
were recorded on audiotape and then transcribed.
For each landmark, we calculated the average message length (in
number of words) across the 19 descriptions (one from each partici-
pant). We also counted the number of descriptions in which the name
of the landmark was mentioned and divided this number by 19 to form
a naming percentage. Next, the 19 sets of transcriptions and the 30 pic-
tures, with the name of the picture concealed, were given to 4 decoders
who were Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong residents and blind to the
hypotheses. The decoders’ task was to pick out from the array of pic-
tures the referent for each description. For each landmark, we counted
the number of times its descriptions were successfully decoded and di-
vided the number by 76 (19 × 4) to form a decoding accuracy percent-
age.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 shows that average decoding accuracy was high for all the land-
marks (range = 85.53% to 97.37%, M = 92.54%, SD =3.06). Moreover, de-
coding accuracy was not related to naming percentage (r = .16) or
average message length (r = -.08). That is, regardless of how long, or
short, a message was and whether the name of the landmark appeared,
the message contained sufficient information for accurate decoding.
Message length ranged from 20.84 to 86.63 words (M = 55.80, SD
=15.41). To examine the influence of knowledge estimation on message
formulation, data of Experiment 2 were examined in relation to the esti-
mated percentage of knowledge of the landmarks obtained in Experi-
ment 1. Message length was negatively correlated with estimated
identifiability of the landmarks (r = -.68, p < .001). When the percentage
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of estimated knowledge of a place increased, its corresponding message
length decreased. Note that the correlation between estimated
identifiability and message length was not discernibly higher in the
present study than in the Fussell and Krauss (1992) experiment (r = -.66
in their Experiment 4), even when addressee feedback was absent in the
present study. This finding suggested that participants in the Fussell
and Krauss experiment might have engaged in perspective taking at
least to the same extent as the participants in the present study. How-
ever, Fussell and Krauss based their analysis exclusively on messages
that contained the referent’s name, and we included all the messages in
our analysis. Thus, the correlations in the two studies should not be com-
pared directly.
As expected, naming percentages (which ranged from 10.53% to
94.74%, M = 37.19%, SD =20.82) had a strong positive correlation with es-
timated identifiability of the landmarks (r = .74, p < .001). When a land-
mark was estimated to be identifiable, more speakers named it in the
message. Also as expected, naming percentages were negatively related
to average message length (r = -.60, p < .001). Participants who included
the name of the landmark in the message were less likely to provide de-
tailed information for identification in the message. Finally, canonical
correlational analysis showed that estimated identifiability of the land-
marks was highly correlated with a linear combination of naming per-
centages and average message length (.62 × naming percentage - .59 ×
average message length), r = .79, p < .001.
Taken collectively, results of the two experiments showed that partici-
pants were sensitive to the distribution of knowledge among their in-
tended audience and took it into consideration when formulating
messages that were sufficiently informative for establishing reference.
When they believed that the addressee would know the target stimulus,
they would mention the name of the stimulus and provide little addi-
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TABLE 2. Decoding Accuracy Percentage, Naming Frequency Percentage, and








(number of words )
All landmarks 92.54 (3.06) 37.19 (20.82) 55.80 (15.41)
Hong Kong 92.56 (8.32) 42.63 (30.70) 48.04 (25.07)
Macau 92.79 (6.17) 32.11 (35.21) 60.57 (41.47)
New York 94.08 (6.63) 36.84 (35.13) 59.33 (35.30)
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.










































tional identification information. When they believed that the addressee
would not know the target stimulus, they would not mention the name
of the stimulus. Instead, they would provide detailed information to fa-
cilitate identification. Although we did not include in this study an in-
teractive communication task, the results of the Fussell and Krauss
experiments suggested that communicators in an interactive task might
have engaged in similar perspective-taking process, at least when they
formulated their first referential message.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study replicated the basic findings of Fussell and Krauss
(1992) within the context of a very different culture, thus establishing
their generalizability. Furthermore, by introducing methodological
modifications, the present study extended the previous findings and
provided direct evidence supporting the utility of knowledge estima-
tion in message formulation. In Figure 1, we present a tentative model of
knowledge estimation and message construction based on the evidence
from the present research. In this model, people are impressively accu-
rate in their estimation of the social distribution of knowledge among
those who are similar to them (in the present context, other undergradu-
ate students from the same university). Message construction follows
the principle of informational sufficiency. Speakers construct messages
that are of sufficient informational value for the addressee to understand
the message. Taking into consideration the estimated knowledgeability
of the addressee in the topic of conversation, speakers either formulate
succinct messages that include the name of the referent or provide lon-
ger messages containing detailed identification information. The same
tendency applies regardless of the speaker’s own knowledge of the tar-
get.
The results from Experiment 1 illustrate one possible source of errors
in knowledge estimation: communicators tend to bias their estimation of
knowledge in others in the direction of their own knowledge. This bias
could lead to inclusion of redundant information when the message con-
structor does not possess much knowledge in the topic of conversation.
The same bias could also lead to construction of messages containing in-
sufficient information for effective decoding when the message con-
structor knows a topic well. Such problems in message construction are
presumably corrected when the addressee’s feedback is available.
Findings of the present study highlighted the importance of knowl-
edge estimation in message formulation. In turn, what is the basis for
knowledge estimation? A good basis is the addressee’s personal charac-
teristics, such as social category membership and geographic residence.
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In Experiment 2, because the intended audience was other Hong Kong
residents, participants would assume that the addressees knew land-
marks in Hong Kong more than those in Macau or New York City. As
shown in Table 2, participants provided names and/or relatively short
descriptions more often for landmarks located in Hong Kong than for
those in Macau or New York City. Future research should examine other
personal characteristics and also other factors that could influence
knowledge estimation.
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